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THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEM OF THE OCEANS: 
AN INTERNATIONAL STEPCHILD OF NATIONAL 
EGOTISM 
Nancy Ellen Abrams* 
INTRODUCTION 
The global threat to the ecological balance of the sea affects every 
nation, whether coastal or land-locked. Intentional discharge of oil 
by tens of thousands of ships around the world, 1 accidental oil spills 
which are becoming more frequent and disastrous as the world 
tanker population increases and capacity of the supertankers grows 
ever more rapidly,2 irresponsible exploitation of the living resources 
of the sea to the point of endangering some species,3 ocean dumping 
of vast quantities of garbage and industrial wastes,4 "disposal" of 
*B.A., 1969, History and Philosophy of Science, University of Chicago; J.D., 1973, Univer-
sity of Michigan; Fulbright Scholar 1974-75; Member of the New Jersey Bar. 
I About 1,370,000 tons of oil are discharged into the sea every year during routine opera-
tions of tankers and other ships, according to the estimate of the Ocean Affairs Board of the 
National Academy of Sciences, Washington, 1973. Accidents dump another 350,000 tons. N. 
MOSTERT, SUPERSHIP 45 (1974) [hereinafter cited as MOSTERT]. 
, At the end of World War II the largest tankers had a deadweight of 18,000 tons. On 
December 31, 1973 there were 388 tankers of 200,000 tons deadweight or over in service and 
493 more under construction or on order. Of these, 119 were in the 260,000 to 280,000 ton class, 
and 26 were of more than 400,000 tons deadweight. (Deadweight tonnage is the actual weight 
in tons that a ship can carry before submerging her load line or Plimsoll mark. Gross tonnage 
would be a measure of enclosed cubic capacity, a useful way to measure passenger ships but 
not oil tankers.) The entire world tanker fleet at mid-year, 1973, stood at just over 200 million 
tons deadweight, which accounted for more than half the tonnage afloat. The 45 million tons 
of supertankers under construction and scheduled for delivery in 1974 alone were the equiva-
lent of the world oil fleet in 1957. [d. at 19-22. 
3 See infra note 19 and accompanying text. 
• THE NATIONAL COUNCIL ON MARINE RESOURCES AND ENGINEERING DEVELOPMENT, ANNUAL 
REPORT 20 (April, 1970) reports that 48 million tons of urban wastes were dumped in 1968 
into waters adjacent to United States coastal areas. Ocean dumping sites are listed off New 
York Harbor (sewage, sludge, mud, stone, cellar dirt and waste acid), Delaware Bay (sewage, 
sludge), and Boston and Charleston Harbors (dredged materials). THE COUNCIL ON 
ENVIRONMENTAL QUAllTY, OCEAN DUMPING: A NATIONAL POllCY 1, 4 lists 246 ocean dumping 
sites off United States coasts. Another source claims: 
3 
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dangerous and sometimes unpredictable substances which no one 
knows how to destroy,5 and deep-sea mining, the long-term effects 
of which are simply unknown,8 are dangers that confront the oceans 
today. 
Pollution of the sea by oil has been recognized as an international 
problem since at least 1926,7 and various international treaties in 
more recent years have attempted to deal with water pollution and 
conservation of fish. 8 Not until the 1972 United Nations Conference 
on the Human Environment in Stockholm, however, was the 
ecological balance of the oceans - a much larger concern than 
pollution alone - properly placed in the context of the quality of 
the international environment. One hundred thirteen States, as well 
as various governmental and non-governmental organizations, par-
ticipated in the Conference from June 5-16, 1972, formulating the 
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and private contractors also conduct dredging activi-
ties which gather up for ultimate ocean dumping such wastes as collected oils and greases, 
concentrations of phosphorus, nitrogen and iron, and heavy metal accumulations such as 
cadmium, chromium, lead and nickel. These elements harm or collect in fish and shell-
food, later entering the food chain for human consumption. 
V. Petaccio, Water Pollution and the Future Law of the Sea, 21 INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARA-
TIVE LAW QUARTERLY 15 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Petaccio]. 
• This problem is particularly apparent with nuclear wastes. Although the United States 
reports that it has not dumped radioactive waste into the sea since 1968, the practice on an 
international level has by no means stopped. L.F.E. GOLDIE, THE PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRON-
MENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 62 (Hague Academy of International Law, Colloquium, 1973) 
[hereinafter cited as GOLDIE]. 
Nuclear fuel from nuclear powered ships, toxins, nerve gases and other sophisticated 
"weapons" and by-products of weapons research, some of which are covered by the 1971 
United Nations Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpil-
ing of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic Weapons and on Their Destruction (not yet in 
force) have also been dumped in the sea. The High Seas Convention (see infra note 25) calls 
on signatory states in article 25 to refrain from dumping wastes which would cause nuclear 
contamination into the ocean, but no enforcement machinery is provided. 
• Life on the sea floor, which would be interrupted by mining, moves at a very slow pace, 
maturity and reproduction requiring up to 200 years. The results of discharging large amounts 
of seabed mud and other sediment into the water column and surface water is unknown. It 
would not sink rapidly, and might shut out sunlight, preventing photosynthesis and thus 
oxygen production by plankton, or an artificial upwelling might, on the other hand, provide 
mineral nutrients for unprecedented growth of plankton. It would probably affect the food 
chain in the ocean and possibly also tides and beaches. Manganese Nodule Mining - Where 
Are We in 1974? reprinted by the United Nations Association of the U.S.A. for inclusion in 
the 1974 Law of the Sea packet, from the OCEAN EDUCATION PROJECT, 245 2d St. N.E., Wash. 
D.C. 20002 [hereinafter cited as OCEAN EDUCATION PROJECT]. 
7 The first international treaty on oil pollution was signed June 16, 1926. T.S. No. 736-
A(E). 
• Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone (infra note 16) art. 24(1); 
Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, art. 7; 
1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, art. 5(7) (infra note 23); Convention on the High 
Seas, arts. 24, 25 (infra note 25). 
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first thorough set of principles for a new and integrated environmen-
tal policy. In its own terms, the Stockholm Declaration of Principles 
marks the beginning of a world-wide consciousness: 
[a] point has been reached in history when we must shape our actions 
throughout the world with a more prudent care for their environmental 
consequences .... A growing class of environmental problems, be-
cause they are regional or global in extent or because they affect the 
common international realm, will require extensive cooperation among 
nations and action by international organizations, in the common inter-
est.9 
The Declaration consists of twenty-six principles, which recite the 
obligation of all States to conserve the natural resources of the 
earth, prevent pollution, and work together for the common good of 
mankind. The principles were also designed, however, as a "realistic 
attempt to reconcile different views and interests."lo Some were 
clearly directed toward the protection of nationalistic or other inter-
ests not always consistent with environmental protection. II Never-
theless, the Declaration was a significant achievement and will un-
doubtedly play an important role in any future international cooper-
ation. 
The United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), the Envi-
ronmental Secretariat, and an Environment Fund were established 
as a result of the Stockholm Conference. 12 In May of 1975 UNEP 
proposed a program of objectives and strategies which places among 
environmental needs of highest priority the development of a body 
of international environmental law. In particular, this program aims 
toward development of environmental law on national and regional 
levels, expansion of remedies and streamlining of procedures in the 
determination of liability and compensation for victims of transna-
tional pollution, and incorporation of the Stockholm principles into 
developing environmental law. The importance of such objectives is 
undeniable, but as long as environmental problems are seen as 
unwanted stepchildren, to be approached as much like other prob-
lems as possible, although generally left for last and fed the leftov-
ers, neither UNEP proposals nor any other international efforts can 
seriously be expected to succeed. 
It is the purpose of this article to examine the main international 
, Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. 
NC. 48/14, at 3. 
10 U.N. Doc. NC. 48/P.C./17, para. 78 (1972). 
1\ For an excellent discussion of the negotiations and a commentary on the results of the 
Conference, see GOLDIE, supra note 5, at 110 et seq. 
t2 G.A. Res. 2997 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at 43, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1973). 
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conventions relating to pollution of the marine environment,13 espe-
cially the newest one now being negotiated at the United Nations 
Law of the Sea Conference. This examination will attempt to dem-
onstrate not only that the conventions themselves are inadequate, 
but more importantly that the practice of treating environmental 
responsibility for the oceans according to traditional notions of 
State sovereignty and as just one more branch of the "Law of the 
Sea" constitutes a serious error. 
1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Until the Age of Exploration, many of Europe's sea-going powers 
claimed sovereignty over large areas of the sea and fought bitter 
wars to vindicate these claims. As men like Columbus, Cabot, Vasco 
da Gama, Magellan and others began to sail to new continents, an 
international legal battle developed as to whether the seas were 
open or closed. In defense of the leading maritime power of the time 
and, more specifically, the Dutch East India Co., the Dutchman 
Hugo Grotius articulated the position that became accepted as the 
doctrine of freedom of the high seas, stating basically that the seas 
can be possessed by no one but are the common property of all.14 A 
nation's sovereignty came to extend also to its territorial sea, a 
narrow band of coastal waters, usually three miles wide. 15 Some 
countries with limited maritime access, like Russia, have claimed a 
territorial sea of up to twelve miles, a practice which has spread. 
Even countries which do not officially claim a twelve mile territoral 
sea, like the United States, exercise police powers and certain other 
controls over a "contiguous zone" extending nine miles beyond the 
three mile territorial sea. IS The one critical exception to a State's 
sovereign rights within the territorial sea and contiguous zone was 
and hliS remained the universal obligation to allow foreign ships 
"innocent passage."17 This limitation is recognized by all nations as 
indispensable to world navigation, and is accepted in their own 
collective interest. IS 
13 Conservation of living resources is a critical but very complex aspect of ocean environ-
mental problems, but complete discussion is beyond the scope of this article. 
14 MARE LIBERUM (1609). 
Ie, The "mile" referred to throughout this article is a nautical mile, which is 800 feet longer 
than a land mile. 
" 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone (adopted by the 
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, April 29, 1958; entered into force Septem-
ber 10, 1964) part II, art. 24 [hereinafter cited as Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone 
Convention]. 
17 [d. at arts. 14-20. 
" For a general discussion of the genesis and development of the law of the sea, see 
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Implicit in the doctrine of freedom of the high seas were the as-
sumptions of the inexhaustibility of marine resources and the infi-
nite cleansing capacity of the seas - assumptions which have 
proved to be untrue. Fishing, if not regulated in accordance with the 
biological realities of migration and reproduction and with a con-
scious view toward conservation, may result in diminished produc-
tivity and even extinction of some species. Thirty of the most widely 
caught commercial species of fin fish are thought to be fished now 
at or beyond maximum sustainable yield. Some formerly important 
fish stocks, such as haddock on George's Bank, can no longer be 
considered commercial stock. Others, such as flounder, halibut, 
ocean perch, and bluefin tuna, are seriously reduced or threatened. 
Some species of whale are close to extinction. Similarly, reckless 
pollution of the sea by oil discharge, dumping, and mining of the 
seabed may lead not only to its degradation but also to extremely 
serious indirect effects on the food chain which man cannot predict, 
let alone reverse. 19 
By the Truman Proclamation of September 28, 1945, the United 
States unilaterally claimed the exclusive right to exploit minerals 
on its entire continental shelf, a territorial claim which one authori-
tative international law scholar labelled a set-back of three and a 
half centuries to the doctrine of the closed sea.20 The claim set off a 
worldwide scramble for national control of the seas at the expense 
of traditional international freedoms.21 The enlarged assertion of 
rights by the United States encouraged other countries which had 
no continental shelf - originally Chile, Ecuador, and Peru - to 
claim in the Santiago Declaration of August, 1952, an "exclusive 
economic zone" extending 200 miles off their coasts, giving them 
exclusive rights not only to minerals but also to the living resources 
of the sea. The claim was clearly inspired and justified by the Amer-
ican claim. It was later adopted by additional Latin American and 
FRIEDMANN, THE FUTURE OF THE OCEANS, esp. 30F (1971) [hereinafter cited as FRIEDMANN]. 
" Plankton is surface matter. It is the basic life of the sea and consists of phytoplankton, 
the "grass" of the sea, that generates, through photosynthesis, at least one third of the 
world's oxygen, and zooplankton, the minute organisms that form the lower animal life 
of the sea; the phytoplankton convert the water's nutrients into sugars, starches and 
proteins upon which all sea creatures ultimately depend through their intertwined cycles. 
Zooplankton feed upon the phytoplankton, and those that feed upon the zooplankton in 
turn feed others. Seabirds fall from the sky and feed selectively upon this thriving 
cycle .... (A)ll that needs to be done to disrupt the marine cycle fatally is to destroy 
the phytoplankton, which oil skim so easily does. 
MOSTERT, supra note I, at 45-46. 
20 FRIEDMANN, supra note 18, at 43-44. 
21 FRIEDMANN, supra note 18, at 30-60. 
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African countries, as well as others.22 As it became technologically 
possible to exploit minerals at greater and greater depths, some 
American interests23 attempted to enlarge the claim of the continen-
tal shelf to include the continental margin as well. 24 
Protection of the marine environment was never considered in the 
staking out of these zones. Such protection will nevertheless depend 
on the boundaries of such zones, because responsibility for the envi-
ronment will tend to be divided up along jurisdictional lines devised 
for completely different purposes, until such responsibility becomes 
international. 
II. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND EXISTING MULTILATERAL 
CONVENTIONS 
Freedom of the high seas has never been absolute in practice. The 
1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas defined freedom of the 
high seas as including, inter alia, freedom of navigation, fishing, 
laying submarine cables and pipelines, and flight over the high seas, 
all of which "shall be exercised by all States with reasonable regard 
to the interest of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the 
high seas."25 The same article specified that these freedoms were to 
" H.S. Amerisinghe, Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka to the United Nations and 
president of the Law of the Sea Conference, The Third UN. Conference on the Law of the 
Sea, 6 UNITAR NEWS 1, 2 (1974). 
23 E.g., the American Petroleum Institute, which represents the interests of the American 
oil indul>try. FRIEDMANN, supra note 18, at 40. Professor Friedmann considered this interpreta-
tion of "continental shelf' to be a "thin legalistic disguise for the unilateral assertion of 
national claims in violation of an international treaty (i. e., the Geneva Convention on the 
Continental Shelf. adopted April 29, 1958; entered into force June 10, 1964)." 
,. The continental shelf consists of "the zone around the continent extending from the low-
water line (the edge of the sea at lowest tide) to the depth at which there is usually a marked 
increase of declivity to greater depth," as defined by the 1969 Rome Symposium on the 
International Regime of the Seabed. The shelf ends at the point where this marked increase 
occurs. Truman defined the shelf in a press release simultaneous with his Declaration as 
including "submerged land which is contiguous to the continent and which is covered by no 
more than one hundred fathoms (600 ft.) of water." The seaward extension of the continental 
shelf to where the water reaches 1200-3500 m. is called the continental slope. Bordering some 
continental slopes is the continental rise, a further zone of generally smooth declivity to a 
depth of 3500-5500 m. The continental shelf, slope, and rise together comprise the continental 
margin, beyond which lies the abyssal plain, the flat area of the deep ocean floor below 5000 
m. FRIEDMANN, supra note 18, at 9-12_ The terms are approximate, and a more precise method 
of delineation of the seabed on the basis of different types of densities of rock rather than 
increasing water depths is still being developed. 
" Geneva Convention on the High Seas, art. 2, adopted by the United Nations Law of the 
Sea Conference, April 29, 1958; entered into force September 30, 1962. The Convention 
purports in its preamble to be a codification of "established principles of international law, " 
so that it may be regarded as stating the customary law on the subject [hereinafter cited as 
High Seas Convention]. 
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be exercised "under conditions laid down by these articles and by 
other rules of international law."28 One of the most important of 
those other rules of international law was stated in the 1938 Trail 
Smelter Arbitration. In that case, fumes from Canada had crossed 
the border into the United States, poisoning the soil, streams and 
crops. The decision held that "[n]o State has the right to use or 
permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury 
... on or to the territory of another or to the properties or persons 
thereon."27 Thus the "four freedoms" of the high seas enumer-
ated by the High Seas Convention and others which on becoming 
legitimate uses of the sea would be subsumed under "inter alia" 
have been restricted in customary international law by the responsi-
bility to exercise a reasonable regard for use of the high seas by other 
States and the obligation not to cause injury to another State's 
territory. 
The High Seas Convention also provided that each individual 
State should draw up regulations against pollution of the sea by oil 
discharge or exploitation of the seabed and take measures to prevent 
pollution caused by dumping radioactive or other harmful waste. 
But the Convention provided no enforcement machinery and no 
possibility of uniform regulation, since interpretation and imple-
mentation of these principles was left to the individual States.28 
The 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous 
Zone contained a provision authorizing coastal States to exercise 
the control necessary in their contiguous zones to prevent or punish 
infringement of their "sanitary regulations" within their territorial 
sea or terri tory. 29 
A series of other conventions concluded under the auspices of the 
Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO)30 
have dealt specifically with pollution of the sea from oil and other 
sources, establishing several important principles. 
Under the 1954 Convention for Prevention of Pollution of the Seas 
by DiP' States agreed not to discharge oil from tankers in certain 
.. [d. 
27 Trail Smelter Arbitration (United States v. Canada), 3 U.N.R.I.A.A. 1905, 1938 (1938 & 
1941). 
28 High Seas Convention, supra note 25, arts. 24, 25. 
20 Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone Convention, supra note 16, art. 24(I)(a). 
30 IMCa was established in 1959 and is the United Nations agency responsible for the 
conduct of world shipping. It has drawn up several conventions respecting pollution from 
ships, but pollution is only one of the areas in which it is involved. It is open to all members 
of the United Nations. 
31 Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Seas by Oil, opened for signature in 
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zones,32 such zones being extended by amendment in 1962, and that 
discharge from ships other than tankers was to be made RS far from 
land as possible. There were, however, significant exceptions, such 
as discharge due to "unavoidable leakage."33 Penalties for violations 
were to be imposed by the flag State of the ship, and were not to be 
milder than the corresponding penalty for a similar discharge of oil 
within the flag State's own territorial waters.34 Covered ships were 
to carry an "oil record book" which could be inspected by any con-
tracting government while the ship was in its port. If it discovered 
a violation, the contracting government would notify the flag State, 
and would have to wait for the flag State to initiate proceedings 
under its own law. Violations, proceedings, and results were to be 
reported to IMCO.35 But the Convention's limited applicability to 
certain types of oil, certain vessels, and certain zones, and its failure 
to address the question of responsibility for damages has made it 
ineffective in eliminating intentional discharge of oil. 36 
In 1967, the wreck of the oil tanker Torrey Canyon forced England 
and France to intervene at the scene of the accident to protect their 
shores. Their emergency action led to two new IMCO conventions 
in 1969, one establishing the right of States to intervene on the high 
seas to protect themselves,37 and one setting up rules and procedures 
for the determination of liability and compensation.3s 
The International Convention Relating to Intervention on the 
High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties provides that States 
may take the measures necessary on the high seas "to prevent, 
mitigate, or eliminate grave and imminent danger to their coast or 
related interests from pollution or threat thereof."39 Before taking 
London, May 12, 1954; entered into force July 26, 1958. Amendments adopted April 4-11, 
1962; entered into force by June 28, 1967. Further amendments adopted by IMCO in 1969 
and 1971 have not yet been ratified by the necessary 2/3 of the governments party to the 
convention. [hereinafter cited as 1954 Oil Pollution Convention]. 
" See Annex A to the Convention, art. 3, replaced by sec. 14 of the 1962 Amendments. 
33 Id., art. 4(a). 
" Id., art. 6(2). 
35 Id., arts. 9-12. 
3ft HALLMAN, TOWARDS AN ENVIRONMENTALLY SOUND LAW OF THE SEA 80 (International Insti-
tute for Environment and Development, 1974) [hereinafter cited as HALLMAN]. For an ex-
traordinary and unforgettable view of the international oil pollution problem and the business 
of the supertankers, see generally, MOSTERT, supra note l. 
37 International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil 
Pollution Casualties (Brussels), adopted November 29, 1969 [hereinafter cited as Convention 
on Intervention]. 9 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 25 (1970). 
38 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (Brussels), adopted 
November 29, 1969 [hereinafter cited as Civil Liability Convention]. 9 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
MATERIALS 45 (1970). 
" Convention on Intervention, supra note 37, art. 12. 
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such measures, however, unless an emergency exists, the endan-
gered State is to consult with other affected States, especially the 
flag State of the ship causing the danger, notify all States and 
persons with known interests, and make use of IMCO's experts in 
choosing the proper measures. 40 Measures taken must be propor-
tionate to the damage, and the Convention on Intervention provides 
criteria for determining proportionality.41 The ultimate judgment, 
however, is left to the endangered State, creating the possibility of 
disputes over proportionality even where measures are taken in the 
best of faith. 42 Perhaps the most serious inadequacies of this particu-
lar convention would arise from its limitation to accidents (casual-
ties), its "grave and imminent" danger standard,43 and its provision 
that danger must be "directly" to the "coast or related interests,"44 
i.e., the ports and territorial waters only.45 
The International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution 
Damage (Civil Liability Convention) applies only to damages to the 
territory or territorial seas of a contracting State.46 With certain 
exceptions, the owner of a ship is strictly liable for damages caused 
by the discharge of oi1. 47 However, unless he was at fault, his total 
liability is limited.48 The 1971 International Convention on the Es-
tablishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pol-
lution Damage (Fund Convention)49 was intended to fill this gap 
and to insure full compensation by means of an international com-
pensation fund with mandatory contributions by shipowners.5o But 
both the Civil Liability and the Fund Conventions are limited to a 
single pollutant, oil, emanating from a specific source, ships (thus 
.. Id., art. 3(a)-(0. 
" Id., art. 4. 
" How such a dispute would be resolved remains to be seen, since the 1969 Convention on 
Intervention is not yet in effect. 
" Convention on Intervention, supra note 37, art. 1 (1) . 
.. Id. 
" Id., art. 2(4). 
" Civil Liability Convention, supra note 38, art. 2. The principle that only contracting 
States are bound by an international convention and that a dispute regarding a non-
contracting State must be determined on the basis of customary international law was con-
firmed by the decision of the International Court of Justice in the North Sea Continental 
Shelf Case, [1969] I.C.J. 3. For a short analysis of the holding, see L.D.M. Nelson, The North 
Sea Continental Shelf Cases and Law-Making Conventions, 35 MODERN LAW REVIEW 52 
(1972). 
47 Civil Liability Convention, supra note 38, art. 3 . 
.. Id., arts. 5-6. 
" International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensa-
tion for Oil Pollution Damage (Brussels), adopted December 18, 1971, 11 INTERNATIONAL 
LEGAL MATERIALS 284 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Fund Convention]. 
50 Id., art. 2 (l)(a). 
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excluding off-shore drilling operations). The limitation of applica-
bility to "territory or territorial seas"51 means that damage to 
coastal resources or other interests in areas beyond the territorial 
seas (including the "economic zone") are not covered. Even under 
the Fund Convention, there is a maximum amount payable per 
accident,52 and no payment is required if damages result from war, 
hostilities, or from oil escaping from a warship or other 
governmental vessel on non-commercial service.53 And, like the 
other conventions, the orientation is remedial, not preventive. 
The international efforts following the Stockholm Declaration54 
have tended to be more comprehensive in scope, but each conven-
tion has avoided the difficult issues of enforcement and standard-
setting powers, sometimes referring these questions to the Law of 
the Sea Conference. IMCO itself has no power to adopt or enforce 
control requirements. It can only recommend measures to govern-
ments or convene international conferences, and in the words of one 
environmentalist, "[s]uch advisory or consultative services as it 
does perform are essentially controlled by major maritime interests. 
The polluters, in other words, are regulating themselves."55 
The final, most obvious, inadequacy of the conventions is that, 
with the exception of the 1954 Oil Pollution Convention56 and its 
" Civil Liability Convention, supra note 38, art. 2; Fund Convention, supra note 49 art. 
3(1). 
" 410 million francs. Fund Convention, supra note 49, art. 4(4)(a). 
" Civil Liability Convention, supra note 38, art. 11; Fund Convention, supra note 49, art. 
4(2)(a). 
" 1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Waste and Other 
Matter; 1972 (Oslo) Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping from 
Ships and Aircraft; 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 
(see supra note 43). 
" HALLMAN, supra note 36, at 53. MOSTERT, supra note 1, at 84, gives an example of this 
control. The world's seas are divided into summer, tropical, and winter load zones. If it is 
summer in the Northern Hemisphere, a tanker bound for Europe from the Persian Gulf (when 
the Suez Canal is closed) must pass from a tropical to a winter sea along the coast of South 
Africa, and rounding the Cape of Good Hope, return to a tropical and then a summer sea in 
Europe. It is unsafe for a tanker to carry as heavy a load in a winter sea, and IMCO had 
established a maximum load for each zone. (1966 International Convention on Load Lines). 
Thus, for the few days of the journey through winter seas, a tanker had to load less oil in the 
Persian Gulf with a consequent reduction in profits. IMCO was asked by the oil companies 
to reconsider the matter. It did so. The Load-Line Convention was amended and tankers were 
allowed to round the Cape with summer loads. Not only did this decision endanger the lives 
of the tanker crews for the shipowners' and oil companies' profits, it has been responsible for 
some of the worst slicks in the area, since the master of a tanker, finding himself in winter 
seas too rough to handle, would have to discharge the extra oil - possibly thousands of tons 
- into the sea to lighten the load and save the ship. Hence the terrible toll in wildlife 
mentioned supra at note 15. Proces-verbal of rectification of the International Convention on 
Load Lines, signed in London, January 30, 1969 and another on May 5, 1969. 
" Supra note 31. 
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1962 (but not its 1969 and 1971) amendments, none of them are in 
effect. 57 There is no guarantee that they will ever come into effect. 
Written into the conventions are provisions for ratification which 
indicate the influence of the major maritime interests on the formu-
lation and nature of the IMCO conventions. The 1973 [MCG Con-
vention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships58 cannot enter 
into force unless at least fifteen States "the combined merchant 
fleets of which constitute not less than 50% of the gross tonnage of 
the world's merchant shipping ... " have become parties to it.59 The 
Civil Liability Convention cannot enter into force unless ratified by 
eight States, including five each with at least 1 million gross tons 
of tanker tonnage. 60 The 1971 Fund Convention cannot enter into 
effect until the Civil Liability Convention does. The Fund 
Convention must also be ratified by at least eight States, each of 
which must have ratified the other convention, and the ratifying 
States must be recipients of substantial specified amounts of oil. 61 
The author contends that the problem of ocean pollution is enor-
mous and extremely difficult to grapple with for at least four 
reasons: the quantity and variety of pollutants entering the oceans, 
the widespread and almost innumerable sources of pollution, the 
vastness of the area to be protected, and the multifaceted clashes 
of interests and attitudes of the nations responsible. The conven-
tions discussed above are multilateral but far from globa1. 62 If rati-
57 The conclusion or signing of an international convention is only the first step in making 
it a binding rule of international law. The convention as signed specified the number and/or 
class of countries which must ratify it to bring it into effect. Each of those countries must 
then comply with its own domestic procedure for the ratification of international treaties. 
When a convention finally enters into effect, many countries must then enact domestic laws 
to implement the international rules within their jurisdiction. 
" [MCO Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, IMCO Doc. MP XIV/8 
(1973). This treaty seeks to incorporate the elimination of intentional pollution of the sea by 
all harmful substances and the minimization of the risk of accidental discharge, thus being 
IMCO's most ambitious attempt to protect the high seas from pollution by dumping. This 
treaty has gone into effect as a result of ratification by fifteen States. The ratifying States 
met in London in December, 1975, to determine how to commence application of the conven-
tion. However, see GOLDIE, supra note 5, at 57, for a discussion of its serious lacunae. 
" [d., art. 15. 
RO Civil Liability Convention, supra note 38, art. 15. 
" Fund Convention, supra note 49, art. 40. 
" TREATIES IN FORCE OF WHICH THE U.S. IS A PARTY AS OF JAN. 1, 1975, compiled by the 
TREATY AFFAIRS STAFF, OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISER, DEPT. OF STATE, PUBLICATION # 8798, 
reports the following numbers of contracting States for the respective treaties: 
1954 Oil Pollution Convention 50 States 
1958 High Seas Convention 55 States 
1958 Continental Shelf Convention 54 States 
1958 Territorial Sea and Continuous 
Zone Convention 44 States 
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fied, they would not solve even the problem of oil pollution. The 
underlying difficulty is that nations have not recognized how imme-
diate and serious the problem of marine pollution really is. They 
continue to believe that in the short run - which is all most govern-
ments ever take into account - they can get by on great statements 
of principle without alienating the monied maritime interests or 
sacrificing any of their own power. In truth, there can be no effective 
pollution control that does not interfere with the shipping industry 
as it is run today.63 There can be no effective pollution control that 
does not require every nation not only to give up a portion of its 
jurisdiction over its flag ships and coastal waters to the interna-
tional community but also to fully support the international com-
munity in its enforcement efforts. Hopefully the present United 
Nations Law of the Sea Conference will at least compel recognition 
of this viewpoint. 
III. THE THIRD UNITED NATIONS LAW OF THE SEA CONFERENCE 
The most comprehensive attempt to date to codify the rights and 
obligations of individual States with respect to the sea and to each 
other's maritime interests has been going on at the United Nations 
Law of the Sea Conference, which met last in Geneva from March 
to May of 1975. The issues being dealt with by the 149 participating 
nations are extremely complex, "preservation of the marine envi-
ronment" being one of some 25 separate subject areas which are in 
turn divided into 81 sub-items.64 No agreements have been reached. 
To the contrary, regional politics, the lack of international sensitiv-
ity, and the proliferation of proposed draft articles on every subject 
have caused many of those concerned with achieving an interna-
tional accord to despair ofreaching one. Three informal negotiating 
texts have been prepared by the Chairmen of the three committees 
of the Conference, however, to "take account of all the formal and 
R3 MOSTERT, supra note 1, gives frightening examples of hasty, untested construction of 
tankers (some of which have had to be recalled, at 75-77,81-82; untrained and incompetent 
crews, at 59-60; faulty equipment, especially radar, at 62-63, generally under flags of conveni-
ence (see infra note 67 and accompanying text), and knowing authorization by the oil compa-
nies of dangerous yet profitable practices, at 29-35, 56, 83-84, leading both to loss of human 
life and devastating oil slicks and spills . 
.. The Conference was set up, basically: to define the breadth of the territorial sea and 
treatment of international straits falling within it; to define rights of coastal States to use 
and exploit ocean resources beyond the territorial sea; to define the areas beyond national 
jurisdiction and establish international machinery to govern exploitation of the seabed in 
such areas; to regulate the management and conservation of fisheries, the transfer of technol-
ogy, and scientific research; and to provide for the preservation of the marine environment, 
including prevention of pollution. G.A. Res. 2750, December 17, 1970. 
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informal discussions held so far" but not to "prejudice the position 
of any delegation."65 The texts were issued May 7, 1975. Although 
the criteria by which the Chairmen prepared these summaries re-
main unclear, they are still the best available indication of where 
the Conference negotiations are heading. 
Part I, the summary of Committee I's work, defines as the 
"Area" the high seas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, and 
would establish an International Seabed Authority to manage and 
control the "Area."66 Part II provides a scheme for dividing up the 
coastal seas into various zones in which States may exercise juris-
dictional or other rights and establishes the rules for charting these 
zones with respect to mainlands, archipelagos, islands, enclosed 
seas, and so forth. Part III presents a blueprint for international 
environmental protection and for the development and sharing of 
scientific knowledge with respect to the seaY In covering protection 
and preservation of the marine environment, marine scientific re-
search, and the development and transfer of technology, Part III is 
largely advisory, relying to a great extent on compliance by coopera-
tion.68 
os Note by the President of the Conference, A/C 62/WP.81 parts I-III. 
" The decision to institute international management of the high seas and their resources 
dates back to the 1970 Declaration of Principles Governing the Seabed and Ocean Floor, and 
the Subsoil Thereof, Beyond the Limits of National Jursdiction, para. 13, G.A. Res. 2749, 
U.N. GAOR Supp. 17, at 24, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970): 
The General Assembly ... [s)olemnly declares that: 
1. The sea-bed and ocean fioor, and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction (hereinafter referred to as the area), as well as the resources of the area, are 
the common heritage of mankind. 
2. The area shall not be subject to appropriation by any means by States or persons 
natural or juridical, and no State shall claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights 
over any part thereof. 
3. No State or person, natural or juridical, shall claim, exercise or acquire rights with 
respect to the area or its resources incompatible with the international regime to be 
established and the principles of this Declaration. 
4. All activities regarding the exploration and exploitation of the resources of the area 
and other related activities shall be governed by the international regime to be estab-
lished. 
5. The area shall be open to use exclusively for peaceful purposes by all States, whether 
coastal or landlocked, without discrimination, in accordance with the international regime 
to be established. 
" Informal Single Negotiation Texts, A/C 62/WP. 81 parts I-III. [hereinafter cited as Nego-
tiating Texts) . 
.. Labeling of the three sections of Part III was left blank in the text. The author has chosen 
to use the capital letters "A", "B", and "C". Since Part III is the only Part divided in turn 
into sections, a slightly different method of citation is used here: the capital letter refers to 
the main section of Part III, the first number to the article, and any further numbers to 
paragraphs and subparagraphs. All are in parentheses for the sake of brevity. 
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In practice the most important part of the Convention from the 
point of view of protection and preservation of the marine environ-
ment will not be Part III, which deals directly with this issue, but 
rather Parts I and II, which deal with economic, territorial, and 
other interests which virtually dictate the limits of Part III. The goal 
of the international management of the seas foreseen by the Confer-
ence is not primarily the protection and conservation of the marine 
environment, but rather the protection of the economic interests of 
States in the resources off their coasts and the assurance that the 
developed nations will not be permitted to exploit freely the re-
sources of the high seas to the detriment of the developing countries. 
Where these goals appear to conflict with the goal of protecting the 
marine environment, the environment is inevitably subordinated. 
The international regime would apply to the" Area," i. e., the sea 
"beyond the limits of national jurisdiction."69 National jurisdiction, 
however, would be simultaneously extended as follows: the breadth 
of the territorial sea, over which a coastal State may exercise full 
sovereignty, would be extended from the customary three to twelve 
miles, to twelve miles in all cases.70 The contiguous zone would be 
extended from twelve71 to twenty-four miles.72 In addition, an "ex-
clusive economic zone" of up to 200 miles73 is recognized in which a 
coastal State may claim: 
(a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, 
conserving and managing the natural resources, whether renewa-
ble or non-renewable, of the bed and subsoil and superjacent 
waters; 
(b) exclusive rights and jurisdiction with regard to the estab-
lishment and use of artificial islands, installations, and struc-
tures; 
(c) exclusive jurisdiction with regard to: 
(i) other activities for the economic exploitation and explora-
tion of the zone, such as the production of energy from the 
water, currents and winds; and 
(ii) scientific research; 
" Negotiating Texts, supra note 67, part I, art. 2. 
7' [d., part II, art. 2. 
71 Under the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone Sea and Continguous Zone Convention, 
supra note 16. 
72 Negotiating Texts, supra note 67, part II, art. 33(2). 
73 All the above distances are measured from the low water line, i.e., the zones overlap. 
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(d) Jurisdiction with regard to the preservation of the marine 
environment, including pollution control and abatement; 
(e) other rights and duties provided for in the present Conven-
tion. 74 
The result of this extension would be the exclusion of 37-40% of 
the world's oceans75 from international controls, at least in the vital 
areas of exploration and exploitation of resources. The lack of the 
word "exclusive" referring to jurisdiction in subsection (d) above 
might leave open the possibility of some concurrent system of inter-
national supervision of marine pollution control, along with coastal 
States' efforts, if any, to encourage compliance with the internation-
ally established minimum standards contemplated. 76 It is by no 
means clear, however, that such international standards, let alone 
international supervision, will be accepted by the Conference. Many 
of the developing countries support a double standard: 
In considering whether a State has discharged its obligation under this 
Convention in respect of preventing, reducing and controlling marine 
pollution, due regard must be paid to all relevant factors including in 
particular the economic and financial ability of a State to provide the 
resources necessary for the discharge of such obligations and the stage 
of economic development of the State.77 
A similar double standard with respect to ships has also been sug-
gested, in the form of exemptions from internationally established 
requirements for their construction, in order to facilitate the build-
ing up of national fleets for developing countries.78 In short, the wide 
discrepancies which exist between states in terms of their economic 
development are being used to justify a weaker international obliga-
tion on the part of the poorer countries to preserve and protect the 
marine environment. Their primary and legitimate concern is their 
economic ability to implement international standards, and, in fact, 
unless they receive monetary and technical assistance from devel-
oped countries, as well as an equitable share of international reve-
nues accruing from the exploitation of the seabed, they will be un-
able to fulfill the minimum obligation to preserve the marine envi-
ronment, a situation potentially disastrous for all countries. 
Considering the Negotiating Texts as the first drafts of the 
,. Negotiating Texts, supra note 67, part II, art. 45. 
" STEIN, CRITICAL ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 9 (International Institute 
for Environment and Development, 1975) [hereinafter cited as STEIN]. 
" Negotiating Texts, supra note 67, part I, art. 12. 
77 U.N. Doc. AlC. 62/C.3/L/15 (Paper No. 11). 
" See the statements made by the delegates of Chile and Brazil in U.N. Doc. AlC. 
62/C.3/SR.6. For a chilling description of the results of the shoddy construction of many of 
today's supertankers, see MOSTERT, supra note 1, at 58-84. 
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Convention,79 the International Seabed Authority in extremely sim-
plified form would function in the following manner. 
As a first principle, no State could claim rights over, and no 
person, natural or juridical, could appropriate any of the resources 
of the "Area." A State or company would apply to the Authority to 
surveyor exploit oceanic areas, and the Authority would determine, 
according to criteria established by the Convention, whether the 
applicant was qualified80 and whether the proposed plan would ben-
efit the AuthorityY If it approved, the Authority would then enter 
into a service contract, joint venture, or other form of association 
"which ensures this direct and effective control at all times over 
such activities."82 Title to minerals or processed substances derived 
" The Negotiating Texts are not the first draft of a final Convention, but they were the 
starting point for negotiation when the Law of the Sea Conference resumed in New York City 
in March, 1976. If they are not analysed carefully now, despite their status as work sum-
maries, there may be no other opportunity to do so. By the end of the 1976 session, if no 
Convention is agreed upon, the whole project may be abandoned because nations will feel 
compelled to take the unilateral actions they have been postponing in hopes of reaching an 
international accord. Iceland has already become the first European nation to claim a 200-
mile exclusive economic zone for fishing rights (N.Y. Times, October 16, 1975, at 5); in 
Washington, the Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Bill would avoid international control by licens-
ing United States companies to mine large blocks of the ocean floor (OCEAN EDUCATION 
PROJECT, supra, note 6). Canada, too, is acting unilaterally to protect the fragile ecology of 
its Arctic waters . 
. . . We are determined to discharge our own responsibilities for the protection of our 
territory. We are equally determined to act as pioneers in pushing back the frontiers of 
international law so that the laissez-faire regime of the high seas will no longer prevent 
effective action to deal with a pollution threat of such a magnitude that even the vast seas 
and oceans of the world may not be able to absorb, dissolve or wash away the discharges 
deliberately or accidentally poured into them. 
In Canada, HOUSE OF COMMONS DEBATES, OFFICIAL REPORT, Vol. 114, Nr. 103, 2d Session, p. 
5831, April 16, 1970. Bill C-202, "An Act to prevent pollution of areas of the Arctic waters 
adjacent to the mainland and islands of the Canadian Arctic" would regulate navigation in 
pollution safety control zones, ship construction and safety standards, and methods of 
operation including shore activities ofresource development and exploitation. Bill C-203, "An 
Act to amend the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act," extends the territorial sea to 12 
miles and pollution control zones to 100 miles. The United States State Department reaction 
charged that the Canadian action was an attempt to extend jurisdiction and sovereignty to 
the exercise "by the United States and other countries of the right to freedom of the seas in 
large areas of the high seas and would adversely affect our efforts to reach international 
agreement on the use of the seas." DEPARTMENT OF STATE STATEMENT ON GOVERNMENT OF 
CANADA'S BILL ON LIMITS OF THE TERRITORIAL SEA, FISHERIES AND POLLUTION, No. 121, April 15, 
1970. 
It would appear that Canada has sparked concern over future access to the Northwest 
Passage of supertankers which would be closed by the 12-mile limit. The 1969 IMCO 
Convention on Intervention on the High Seas and art. 24 of the High Seas Treaty would seem 
to support in purpose the Canadian action. See Albert Koers, Canadian Arctic and the 
Northwest Passage, OCEAN SCIENCE NEWS, No.1, June 1970, for a discussion of the Canadian 
position . 
•• Negotiating Texts, supra note 67, annex 1, para. 7. 
M! Id., annex 1, para. 4(b). 
" Id., part I, art. 22. 
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from the Area would be in the Authority83 which would then "offer 
its pr<;>ducts for sale at not less than international market prices," 
except that it could, however, "sell its products at lower prices to 
developing countries, particularly the least developed among 
them."s4 
All States party to the Convention would be equal members of the 
Authority, S5 which would thus be "the organization through which 
States Parties shall administer the Area .... "88 The Authority 
would consist of an Assembly, a Council, a Tribunal, an Enterprise, 
and a Secretariat, each with specified structure and powersY In the 
Assembly, each member would have one vote. The Council would 
consist of 36 members, to be elected by the Assembly. Six would 
represent the developing countries, six the industrialized countries, 
and the remaining 24 would represent as equitably as possible the 
five geographical regions, defined as "Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe 
(Socialist), Latin America, and 'Western Europe and others.''' The 
United States and Canada apparently fall into the category of "oth-
ers."88 The Tribunal, the adjudicatory arm of the Authority, would 
exercise exclusive jurisdiction over all disputes arising under the 
Convention,89 and its judgments would be enforceable in each mem-
ber State as if they were judgments of the highest court of that 
State.90 
The creation of the Seabed Authority could be a positive step if 
it fulfills its stated purpose of preventing the indiscriminate and 
irresponsible exploitation of the ocean's resources and managing the 
development of those resources for the benefit of mankind with a 
special view toward aiding developing countries91 and protecting the 
marine environment.92 But the Authority itself is set up in many 
ways as an entrepreneur. Part I provides that "[n]otwithstanding" 
the provisions requiring it to carry out activities directly or through 
States or enterprises directly controlled by them, "in order to pro-
.. [d., annex 1, para. 2 . 
.. [d., para. 4(e) . 
.. [d., part I, arts. 20, 21. 
.. [d., art. 21. 
87 [d., arts. 24-41. 
ss [d., art. 27(1)(c). 
so [d., part I, art. 32 . 
•• [d., art. 59. 
II See, e.g., id., arts. 7, 9, 10 . 
• 2 [d., art. 12. It is certainly preferable to the suggestion that horrified Professor Friedmann 
of partitioning the whole world's oceans (based on the exploitability clause of the Geneva 
Convention on the Continental Shelf. art. 1; see supra note 23.). For a map of such a hypo-
thetical division, see FRIEDMANN. supra note 18, at 4-5. 
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mote the earliest possible commencememt of activities in the area" 
the Authority shall "identify as early as practicable ... 10 econo-
mically viable mining sites" and "enter into joint ventures" with 
States and enterprises it selects.93 In the granting of opportunities 
for such activities, special consideration is to be given to developing 
nations.94 Yet another provision requires that the applicant demon-
strate "(1) financial standing, (2) technological capability, and (3) 
past performance and work experience"95 in order to be deemed 
qualified. These qualifications can only be met by companies or 
state enterprises from developed States - and very few of such 
States.96 
From the point of view of environmental protection, very serious 
problems emerge. "Appropriate measures shall be taken," 
according to article 12, 
to adopt and implement international rules, standards, and procedures 
for the prevention of pollution and interference with the ecological bal-
ance of the marine environment; particular attention will be paid to the 
need for protection from the consequences of drilling, waste disposal, 
construction and operation of installations, etc., and to the protection 
and conservation of the natural resources of the Area and the prevention 
of damage to the flora and fauna of the marine environmentY 
But no answer is given to the question of how such measures are to 
be accomplished consistent with the expressed intention of promot-
ing the "earliest possible commencement of activities," given the 
warnings of environmentalists that with respect to manganese, co-
balt, copper and nickel nodules in the deep seabed, 
the principal feature of the problem is our almost complete ignorance 
of the likely biological effect of mining them. . .. Our knowledge of the 
ecology of the deep ocean floor is poor. This cold, dark world appears 
sparsely populated. Its flora and fauna, however, show a great diversity 
living in a very fragile balance of conditions where life-processes operate 
in extreme slow-motion (deep sea molluscs take some 200 years to reach 
sexual maturity). The process of chain-buckets or suction heads used to 
bring up the nodules is likely to wreak incalculable historic destruction, 
" Negotiating Texts, supra note 67, part I, art. 22 . 
.. [d., art. 23 . 
•• [d., annex 1, para. 7 . 
.. According to the OCEAN EDUCATION PROJECT, supra note 6, there are only four companies 
technologically able to mine the deep sea bed (as of 1974); Howard Hughes' Summa Corp., 
the most advanced; Kennecott Copper; International Nickel; and Deep Sea Ventures, a 
subsidiary of Tenneco Corp. Probably France, West Germany and Japan also have companies 
as advanced as these. 
" Negotiating Texts, supra note 67, part I, art. 12. 
1976] OCEAN ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEM 21 
but no evaluation of what and how has been made by scientists, nor, 
clearly, is it possible to form a comprehensive picture of the scale of 
damage from large-scale operation until at least some mining has been 
done on a commercial scale, a development likely to take place before 
1977 .... 
The water column and surface effects of mining operations are likely to 
produce more serious damage ... a great increase in turbidity (cloudi-
ness) is expected in surface waters. This turbidity is very likely to affect 
plankton growth, on which marine-and other-life relies for its food 
and oxygen supply, because less light will penetrate the upper water 
layers. The ever-moving surface currents of the oceans will spread these 
effects to far wider areas than the immediate surroundings of mining 
vessels. 9s 
The further dangers of refining the minerals at sea are even less well 
understood. 
The central concerns of Committee I, however, are elsewhere. 
Some developing countries have expressed misgivings about the in-
terests which may control the Authority and fear that the Authority 
will either exploit the resources itself or simply license those who are 
already exploiting.99 The industrialized countries - particularly the 
European Economic Community and Japan, whose industry is 
heavily dependent on an imported supply of raw materials loo - are 
maneuvering to assure the free availability of minerals on the mar-
ket without artificial restraints or price-fixing by the Authority. 
They fear that a third-world dominated Authority might impose 
unworkable conditions of exploitation, and that they would have to 
ratify the scheme before knowing how the mining system would 
work. IOI Land-based producers are seriously concerned about com-
petition from sea-mined minerals, some of which may be of higher 
quality than land ore. I02 Consumer countries, on the other hand, 
fearing politically motivated restrictions in sales by third world 
countries, as occurred in the Arab oil embargo, would like an alter-
native source of minerals. In this context, it is unlikely that the 
Authority, in determining the advisability of proposals by would-be 
.. STEIN, supra note 75, at 32 . 
.. Report by UNCTAD Secretary-General, March 5, 1975, to the Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea. 
'00 M. Hardy, Regional Approaches to Law of the Sea Problems: The European 
Community, 24 INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY 336, 345 (April 1975). 
'0' Stevenson and Uxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: 
The 1974 Caracas Session, 69 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, No.1, (January 
1975). 
1112 Manganese. See Ocean Education Project, supra note 6, at 2. 
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developers, will give environmental considerations the attention 
which they require. 
Part III of the Negotiating Texts, with the international obliga-
tion of developed countries to help developing ones as its basic 
premise, formulates an excellent program. States are to cooperate 
on a global or regional basis, directly or through competent interna-
tional organizations, in, among other things: 
(a) standard-setting, 103 
(b) notifying other States of dangers to the marine environ-
ment,104 
(c) jointly developing contingency plans,105 
(d) scientific research studies, 108 
(e) working out scientific criteria for the elaboration of rules, 
standards, recommended practices and procedures for the pre-
vention of marine pollution, 107 
(f) at least seven kinds of technical assistance programs,108 
(g) monitoring pollution, 109 
(h) providing assessments to others, 110 
(i) harmonizing national laws, 111 
(j) working together to establish global and regional rules and 
. procedures for 
1) determining liability and damages for environmental 
harm,l12 and 
2) controlling pollution. from 
i) land-based sources, 113 
ii) exploration of marine resources, 114 
iii) dumping,115 and 
iv) vessels and the atmosphere. ll8 
States are also to develop programs and research centers in develop-
'03 Negotiating Texts, supra note 67, part III (A)(6). 
, •• [d., (A)(7). 
'05 [d., (A)(8). 
'01 [d., (A)(9). 
'81 [d., (A)(lO). 
, .. [d., (A)(ll). 
, •• [d., (A)(13). 
II. [d., (A)(14). 
III [d., (A)(16)(2), (A)(17)(2). 
112 [d., (A)(17), (B)(36). 
113 [d., (A)(16). 
". [d., (A)(17). 
"5 [d., (A)(19). 
II. [d., (A)(20). 
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ing countries "in order to stimulate and advance the conduct of 
marine scientific research by developing States."117 
However, the availability of technical assistance, even if achieva-
ble, is not sufficient unless all States are both convinced of the need 
and compelled by law to fulfill the obligations of caring for the 
environment in their own sovereign waters. Part III has been molded 
by developing countries into essentially a comprehensive resoluton 
by "States" to cooperate in all ways mentioned above to further the 
technical progress of the developing countries. Part III does not 
really impose any obligation upon coastal States, many of which are 
developing countries, to meet international standards. To the con-
trary, the author contends that developing coastal States would 
have the world recognize an international obligation to make techni-
cal assistance available to them without their having to fulfill the 
corresponding obligation to the international community of meeting 
the same environmental standards as the developed countries. Only 
one provision in section A of Part III (dealing with protection and 
preservation of the marine environment) recognizes a universal obli-
gation: "States have the obligation to protect and preserve all the 
marine environment."118 This is followed immediately by the provi-
sion that: 
States have the sovereign right to exploit their natural resources pur-
suant to their environmental policies, and they shall, in accordance with 
their duty to protect and preserve the marine environment, take into 
account their economic needs and their programs for economic 
development. 1I9 
International environmental protection is compromised from this 
point on for the sake of individual national interests. 
Nothing prevents coastal States from polluting their own waters 
except the restriction not to let such pollution spread into other 
States' waters. 120 "Substantial" self-pollution is even contemplated 
in the section requiring circulation of environmental assessments in 
such cases to other affected States. 121 Coastal States have, for exam-
ple, the "exclusive right to permit, regulate, and control ... dump-
ing," yet Part III obligates coastal States only to require that pro-
117 Id., (C)(lO). 
I" Id., (A)(2). 
I" Id., (A)(3). 
1111 Id., (A)( 4)(2). 
III Id., (A)(15). 
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spective dumpers obtain official permission before dumping. 122 War-
ships and other vessels on government non-commercial service are 
exempt from both the standards and enforcement sections,123 al-
though they certainly possess the same capability of polluting as 
other ships. 
Although Part III directs States to "endeavour" to establish 
global and regional environmental rules (and in certain cases directs 
that States "are" to establish them), their primary obligation under 
that part is to develop national environmental laws until the larger 
schemes can be achieved. 124 With respect to pollution from vessels 
and from dumping, such global and regional rules are to be estab-
lished "to the extent that they are not already in existence."125 This 
statement, which makes no distinction between rules in existence 
which are in effect and those which are not, presumably refers to 
the IMCO conventions discussed earlier, and possibly also to more 
limited bi- or multi-lateral treaties. The national laws of coastal and 
flag States regulating these same activities are to be "no less effec-
tive" than the international rules and standards. 126 The limited 
scope and effectiveness of the IMCO conventions, the majority of 
which have never gone into effect, have been discussed earlier in this 
article. If national laws must only be equally effective and need not 
cope with any areas covered by these conventions, the current Nego-
tiating Text is asking very little. 
Furthermore, States are said to have the "right" - not the duty 
- to enforce laws adopted in accordance with the Convention for 
land-based sources of pollution 127 and exploitation of the continental 
shelf. 128 Part III thus invites insufficient enforcement in at least two 
of the most critical areas, since up to 90% of all ocean pollution has 
been estimated to come from land-based sources,129 and the amount 
that might result from exploitation of the continental shelf once 
that activity gets underway in earnest is simply unknown. 
Only the flag State is required to enforce its own law with respect 
to its ships, wherever they may be. 130 This enforcement mechanism, 
122 [d., (A)(19). 
123 [d., (A)(42). 
124 See, e.g., id. (A) (16, 17, 19, 20), (B)(35), (C)(6). 
125 [d., (A)(19)(2), (A)(20)(1). 
'" [d., (A)(19)(4), (A)(20)(2). 
12' [d., (A)(22). 
I" [d., (A)(23). 
'" Wild West Scramble for Control, TIME MAGAZINE, July 29, 1974, at 51. See also supra 
note 4. 
130 Negotiating Texts supra note 67, part III (A)(26). 
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as proposed by Part III, closely parallels that of the 1954 Oil Pollu-
tion Convention. Yet such enforcement is the easiest type to escape. 
Realistically, there may be little incentive for a flag State to punish 
its own nationals for offenses in foreign waters, since such enforce-
ment might place its ships at a competitive disadvantage unless all 
States were equally vigilant. A large number of the world's tankers 
fly a so-called "flag of convenience," which means that they are 
registered in small, non-seafaring nations such as Liberia, Panama, 
Costa Rica, Honduras, Lebanon, or Cyprus, whose interest in en-
forcing international shipping and pollution regulations may be 
minimal, and whose ports the ship may never have visited or ever 
intend to. 13l 
Consequently, if a coastal State chose to favor its economic ad-
vantage at the expense of the environment, Part III would do little 
to hinder it. If, on the other hand, a coastal State wished to be as 
vigilant as possible in the protection of its environment, the Con-
vention's choice of priorities would actually present some impedi-
ments, as illustrated by the following provision: 
In taking measures to prevent pollution of the marine environment 
States shall have due regard to the legitimate uses of the marine envi-
ronment, which are not incompatible with the provisions of this Conven-
tion, and shall refrain from unjustifiable interference with such uses. 132 
This provision is essentially repeated with respect to marine re-
search.133 
Once international rules and standards regulating pollution have 
been established, a coastal State may enact "more effective" ones 
only in its territorial sea, and "such laws and regulations must not 
have the practical effect of hampering innocent passage through the 
131 Twenty years ago, Britain was the biggest owner and operator of ships. Outside Europe, 
America and Japan were the only major shipping nations. Liberia now has the world's largest 
merchant marine. On paper, Liberia and Panama together now own nearly a quarter of all 
world shipping, with tankers dominating these expatriate fleets. Liberian tonnage is 35-40%. 
American-owned; an additional 10% is American-financed. MOSTERT, supra note 1, at 55-58. 
American users of flags of convenience, and they include Gulf, Esso, Texaco, Getty Oil, 
Tidewater and Union Oil, have argued that they act not for convenience but out of 
necessity. Their plea has been that without the flags of convenience the American mer-
chant fleet would have substantially vanished by now, because of costs. They have 
pleaded in fact that theirs is a patriotic stance .... 
[d. at 58-59. 
Legally, a ship can fly any flag as long as there is a "genuine link" between the ship and 
the State. 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas, supra note 25, arts. 5-6. 
132 Negotiating Texts, supra note 67, part III (A)(4). 
133 [d., (B)(4). 
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territorial sea."134 This restatement of customary internationallawl35 
fails to recognize that passage which traditionally was innocent may 
also have been polluting. "Innocent" passage needs to be redefined 
by this Convention to reflect environmental concerns before it is 
automatically given precedence over possibly desirable environ-
mental measures. In the economic zone a coastal State may not 
enact more effective laws merely because international standards 
are inadequate or even non-existent. Only if international standards 
are non-existent or inadequate to meet special circumstances, and 
the coastal State first makes documented application to the "com-
petent international organization" to be recognized as a "special 
area," will such measures apparently be proper .136 The only excep-
tions to these requirements in the economic zone are measures es-
sential for the protection of navigation or for the prevention of pollu-
tion so grave that it threatens "major harm to or irreversible dis-
turbance of the ecological balance."137 
The concept of the 200-mile economic zone, recognized by the 
Convention, has been justified by its major Latin American propo-
nents as necessary to the preservation and conservation of the sup-
ply of fish on which their people depend. This rationale may be true 
from the point of view of the supply available to each individual 
state. But from the environmental or conservation point of view, 
which seeks to maintain the maximum sustainable yield, zones are 
not useful devices for the protection of fishing resources. The follow-
ing observation by former Supreme Court Justice William O. Doug-
las is illustrative: 
[Atlantic salmon are] harvested without regard to the condition of 
different runs up the coastal streams where they spawn. High seas fish-
ing for salmon entails the loss of half of the total injured or killed by 
ocean netting or long-lining but not captured. Limitation of salmon 
fishing to the mouths of streams and to the streams themselves insures 
some control of the proper escapement for each run. Though both the 
United States and Russia approved the proposed [Atlantic salmon] 
Convention, Denmark and West Germany, later joined by Norway, re-
fused to accept it. The consequences are tragic. For the place off Green-
land where the Atlantic salmon congregate after they return to the ocean 
is now fished without restraint, the experts predicting that this delicacy 
will soon be extinct. 138 
,3< Id., (A)(20)(2). 
13. Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone Convention, supra note 16, art. 15(1). 
'30 Negotiating Texts, supra note 67, part III (A)(20)(4). 
137 Id., (A)(20)(5). 
,3' Douglas, Environmental Problems of the Oceans: The Need for International Controls, 
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Only international controls that accord with the biological realities 
of fish migration and breeding habits can protect the fish and en-
hance their supply. 
The 200-mile economic zone is also irrelevant to the spread of 
pollution, which respects no political boundaries. If pollution con-
trol within the economic zone is left to the coastal States, restricted 
only by international minimum standards, up to 40% of the world's 
oceans will be in whatever condition the coastal States believe it is 
in their interest, always considering their economic positions, to 
maintain. And jurisdiction in some cases will extend far more than 
200 miles because the continental shelf, under this Convention's 
definition, extends beyond the territorial sea "throughout the natu-
ral prolongation of [the coastal State's] land territory to the outer 
edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical 
miles" from the low water line, whichever is greater .139 And under 
the Convention, "the coastal State exercises over the continental 
shelf sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting 
its natural resources."140 In short, to the full extent of the newly-
defined continental shelf, a coastal State would exercise exclusive 
jurisdiction to exploit resources. The international regime would 
have no hand in the prevention of resulting pollution except in 
providing a set of minimum standards which the coastal State itself 
is supposed to enforce. Although there is considerable discussion 
among States as to the roles flag, port, and coastal States should 
play in enforcing vessel-source pollution standards in coastal zones, 
no one supports international enforcement. 141 
The United Nations Law of the Sea Conference might seem to be 
the ideal structure in which to develop a global, comprehensive, and 
far-sighted program of protection for the ocean environment. Unfor-
tunately, the prospects for such a program actually emerging are not 
good. The other concerns of the participating nations so overshadow 
environmental ones that, in order to be dealt with in the Law of the 
Sea context, environmental protection has been trimmed down to 
the point where little, if anything, is being proposed that might 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 149, 153 (Spring 1971) [hereinafter cited as Douglas) . 
... Negotiating Texts, supra note 67, part II, art. 62. 
140 [d., art. 63. 
'" The United States has proposed "international inspection" in coastal zones, because the 
coastal State is not the only one which may be damaged or affected by pollution from seabed 
activities. Statement by John N. Moore, Vice-Chairman of the U.S. Delegation to the Com-
mittee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National 
Jurisdiction, Subcommittee III, July 18, 1973 [hereinafter cited as Statement by John N. 
Moore). 
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disturb any nation's priority proposals or constitute an item of con-
troversy requiring compromise or concessions elsewhere. Environ-
mental provisions are not only being limited to avoid interference 
with other areas, however. They are in some cases actually being 
structured to serve indirectly those other interests, as the following 
quotation indicates: 
The basic goal of the U.S. pollution articles is to protect U.S. naviga-
tional interests by preventing coastal nations from asserting and enforc-
ing vessel pollution standards in their economic zones (emphasis 
added),If2 
This is not a statement by a critic of United States policy but an 
extract from the report to the United States Senate by the four 
senators who advised the United States delegation at the 1974 Cara-
cas session of the Conference. With reference to the United States 
proposal at Caracas that IMCO set vessel pollution standards and 
flag and port States enforce them, the senators continue: 
[T]he U.S. position fails to take into consideration the fact that the 
vast majority of the nations participating in the Conference have little 
or no real interest in international pollution control, and if forced to vote 
would grant the coastal state wide jurisdiction over both marine-based 
and vessel source pollution. The developing nations still believe that 
they should not be hampered in their efforts to develop by international 
pollution regulations. To most of the countries at the Conference, pollu-
tion control rates low on their list of priorities. 
Within the U.S. draft articles, there are provisions which provide the 
port state with rights to impose higher standards for vessel source pollu-
tion. There are indications that the U.S. delegation may be considering 
a retreat from these provisions. Consequently within the next year, it is 
possible that U.S. environmental groups may abandon their support for 
the U.S. Law of the Sea position, and approach Congress with bills 
unilaterally extending jurisdiction for pollution control purposes.143 
The International Seabed Authority offers a structure in which all 
countries, at least in principle, may direct the management of their 
common heritage on an equal basis. The Authority could be one of 
the most promising juridical innovations yet proposed for interna-
tional environmental protection. But the divisions among nations 
are sharp, and the economic implications of the Authority are criti-
cal for many of them. A country which might in another context 
141 The Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference, Report to the United States 
Senate by Senators Pell, Muskie, Case, and Stevens, February 5, 1975, at 4. 
141 rd. 
1976] OCEAN ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEM 29 
support environmentally protective measures for the oceans can 
hardly afford to do so here, where it has so many other interests at 
stake, each defendable only at a price, and where every country or 
regional group is fighting for itself. The Authority's jurisdiction is 
only over the high seas, and no country will sacrifice its own benefit 
for the sake of the common heritage when the others are not simi-
larly concerned. 
Part II's apportionment of rights and jurisdiction by zones may 
serve the very legitimate purpose of protecting nations' economic 
interests in the resources off their shores, but in doing so sovereignty 
over the zones is so jealously guarded that protection of the marine 
environment - which requires an essentially different approach -
has been divided up as if it were a sovereign right. As a right rather 
than an obligation, it becomes one more piece of currency to be 
exchanged for some more attractive concession. The following are 
examples of this problem. With the extension of the territorial sea 
to 12 miles, 112 international straits less than 24 miles wide will fall 
completely within the territorial seas of various coastal States.144 In 
an all-out effort to have a right of "unimpeded passage" recognized 
in these straits so that its warships and nuclear submarines may 
pass independently of coastal States' subjective interpretations of 
"innocent passage," the United States wants to assure those States 
as much sovereignty as possible in the territorial sea to convince 
them to accept this critical limitation. Pollution is thus classified 
as one of the "legitimate concerns" of a coastal State in the terri-
torial sea.145 The same problem does not exist in the 200-mile eco-
nomic zone, however, since the economic zone involves no threat to 
free passage. The more immediate American concern in that zone 
is that coastal States not be permitted to set their own construction 
standards for ships. The United States thus insists that problems 
of vessel-source pollution are fundamentally different from those 
raised by land-based sources or seabed resource activities. Both of 
the latter should be governed, according to the United State~ posi-
tion, by the coastal State, while vessel-source pollution should be 
governed by the flag State. The United States would also make a 
distinction between jurisdiction to set and jurisdiction to enforce 
standards. The first type of jurisdiction would rest with IMCO, the 
second with a combination of the flag, port and coastal States.148 
I .. Id. at 2. 
I •• Id. 
I .. SPECIAL REpORT: UNITED NATIONS LAw OF THE SEA CONFERENCE 1975, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE 
PUBUCATION 8764, February 1975, at 6 [hereinafter cited as SPECIAL REpORT]. 
30 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 5:3 
This is not an irrational position, all things considered. But from the 
environmental point of view such distinctions make no sense. The 
waters become polluted whatever the source and whoever happens 
to have jurisdiction. An intelligent, coordinated environmental pol-
icy cannot emerge when environmental concerns are so distorted for 
the sake of other interests that the United States position outlined 
above is prefaced as follows: 
The very awareness of the need to protect the marine environment, 
however, may hold a subtle danger for the law of the sea, unless we are 
careful to functionally distinguish the differing threats to the marine 
environment. 147 
This attitude that the law of the sea must be protected from the 
environmentalists, even at the expense of the sea itself, is the root 
of the problem. The law of the sea has always been a system of 
regulating behavior and apportioning rights among nations. What 
duties there are have been only to other nations or people. The sea 
itself was a given. But the sea can no longer be considered a given. 
It can no longer be divided, exploited, and abused by nations who 
see other nations as the only forces to be reckoned with. Protection 
and preservation of the sea is not a question of relations among 
nations, but between nations (or people) and the planet. Preserva-
tion of the sea is prior to the law of the sea, in urgency as well as 
logic. The sea is an entity to be reckoned with and the most impor-
tant, if unrepresented, party at the present negotiations. However 
legitimate each nation's struggle may be for a fair share of the 
oceans' wealth, the pie will simply have to be split one more way 
and a portion reinvested in the preservation of the sea. 
An internationalist, as opposed to a nationalist, orientation has 
represented a seemingly unreachable goal for decades or even centu-
ries. While in earlier times, with respect to problems among people, 
it might have been an ideal, it has become today, with respect to 
problems between mankind and the earth, a prerequisite for sur-
In conjunction with its proposal that IMCa be the international organization to set vessel-
source pollution standards, the United States has put forward in the IMCa Council a pro-
posal for changing the IMCa structure to create a new Marine Environmental Protection 
Committee specifically for dealing with vessel-source pollution. This committee would ensure 
that IMCa's regulations keep up with technological changes, because it would be empowered 
to adopt and circulate such regulations to governments without time-consuming review or 
approval of the IMCa Assembly or Council. The regulations would go into effect automati-
cally unless objected to by a specified number or category of States. The committee would 
have regional subcommittees to deal with regional problems, and membership on the commit-
tee would be open to all concerned States. Statement by John N. Moore, supra note 141. 
147 SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 146, at 6. 
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vival. Our destructive powers are greater than our ability to control 
them. No precautions could shield a single country from ecological 
catastrophe brought about by others any more than from a nuclear 
holocaust brought arrout by others. But even today, the reaction of 
developing countries in the face of international competition and 
economic pressures has been to assert their sovereignty and seek 
protection for their interests by extending and strengthening their 
control over all of the country's resources. The developed countries, 
too, assert their sovereignty at the first hint of a threat to the flag 
ships and overseas investments of their citizens or to the freedom 
of "their" multinational enterprises. At the same time, both devel-
oped and developing countries seem to recognize, as evidenced by 
the existence of the Conference, that for the benefit of all, precisely 
the opposite of these divisive nationalistic efforts is required today 
- progress toward international cooperation and international con-
trols. War can at least be postponed. Ecological destruction of the 
seas is occurring gradually but inexorably day by day. There is no 
time to wait. 
CONCLUSION 
The Law of the Sea Conference may never result in a convention. 
If it does, the convention may never be ratified. Even were a conven-
tion agreed upon and ratified - an undertaking which would re-
quire several years at minimum - it would do practically nothing 
to protect the living resources of the seas or to control pollution of 
the seas, since most of such pollution is caused by land-based 
sources,148 an area the Convention does not attempt to regulate. 
Regardless of the economic apportionment of the sea's resources, 
there is no reason why division of responsibility for environmental 
controls must be made along the same lines. The problem of the 
marine environment is immediate and unique, and it is better that 
its treatment be fast and effective than conceptually symmetrical. 
Former Justice William O. Douglas has suggested, for example, that 
for the purpose of international ecological controls, the international 
seas be deemed to start at the low water line. The sovereign rights 
of states over the territorial sea and economic zone would thus be 
limited. Such limitation would not be novel, since these rights are 
already limited by the traditional exception of "innocent passage" 
through territorial waters, an exception which has not destroyed the 
, .. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
32 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 5:3 
historical functions of the concept of a territorial sea. The ecological 
preservation of the oceans is no less compelling an interest than that 
of the world need for free movement of ships and would benefit from 
similar treatment as an exception to customary international law. 
From another point of view, just as the individual in society is 
subject to the overriding police power of the community even on his 
private property, the rights of a coastal State to drill and exploit its 
resources should be subject to ecological safeguards. This approach 
would not abridge the coastal State's economic advantage, but 
would require greater responsibility in the exercise of its economic 
freedom.149 Eventually, even inland waterways that run into the sea 
or between countries will have to be regarded as the common heri-
tage of mankind. 150 
Whatever form the solution takes, protection and preservation of 
the marine environment must be dealt with directly, immediately, 
and separately. By tacking environmental issues onto the enormous 
and politically hair-raising task of re-writing the law of the sea, the 
Conference has made those enviromental concerns legally and polit-
ically dependent upon extremely complex problems whose solutions 
bear no real relevance to them. Committees I and II cannot escape 
the major responsibility for environmental protection by placing it 
upon Committee III, but must accept this responsibility and cooper-
ate with Committee III if any effective environmental measures are 
to emerge from this Conference. If no Convention is reached, the 
environmental problem must be dealt with directly, possibly on a 
more limited, regional basis at first.l5l International protection of 
the oceans is not an option but a necessity. There is no other way 
to reverse our present course and prevent the ecological destruction 
of the oceans. 
'"~ Douglas, supra note 138, at 162. 
, .. Petaccio, supra note 4, at 38-39. 
10' The next alternative is to begin a notch lower in the political spectrum by considering 
the feasibility of a new hybrid form of regional seabed regimes. Pilot seabed regimes organized 
by region would represent a bridge linking the all-or-nothing conviction of internationalists 
who support international supervision, and nationalists who accept the need for controls but 
who also fear a western or big power takeover of marine resource and water-use rights in the 
name of international action. 
Presumptively, a period of pilot seabed regimes would provide the working experience and 
psychological reassurances requisite to accepting control by the proposed International 
Seabed Resources Authority. [d. at 40. 
